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I. INTRODUCTION
If medical professionals from the early twentieth century stepped into
a hospital today, the scene would be nearly unrecognizable. The scientific and
technological breakthroughs throughout the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries have resulted in monumental advances within the study and practice
of medicine.1 These breakthroughs profoundly transformed nearly all areas of
medical science, research, and treatment during the twenty-first century.2
These monumental advances in technology include the increased reliance on
telecommunication and computer technologies, which have expanded
treatment options and improved the quality of and access to medical care.3
The implementation and use of these advancements, which vary by country,
depend on a number of factors, including national infrastructure, policy and
governance, cultural and humanitarian considerations, the availability of
medical experts, among others.4 However, even developed countries that are
well-positioned for the widespread use of medical technology have
implemented telemedicine—a tool that allows doctors to physically separate
themselves from their patients while still providing adequate levels of care—
only in a limited capacity.5 For many countries, that changed in 2019, when
they were forced to reckon with a global pandemic.6
1

See generally Mary L. Fennell, The New Medical Technologies and the Organizations of
Medical Science and Treatment, 43 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1 (2008) (discussing the evolution
of medical science and treatment and the impact of technological improvements on
healthcare organizations).
2 Id. at 1 (noting the profound changes in medical science and research during the twentyfirst century, including innovations and discoveries in biology, pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, and information technology).
3 INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE,
TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH CARE 3, 16
(Marilyn J. Field ed. 1996).
4 World Health Org. [WHO], TELEMEDICINE: OPPORTUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
MEMBER
STATES
67
(2010),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44497/9789241564144_eng.pdf?sequence
=1&isAllowed=y. See also Clemens Scott Kruse et al., Evaluating Barriers to Adopting
Telemedicine Worldwide: A Systematic Review, 24 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 4, 7 tbl.
1 (2016) (noting and discussing similar factors limiting access to telemedicine).
5 See Kruse et al., supra note 4, at 7 tbl. 1 (identifying barriers to telemedicine in several
developed countries, such as the United States, Belgium, Netherlands, and Australia);
Rashid L. Bashshur et al., Sustaining and Realizing the Promise of Telemedicine, 19
TELEMEDICINE J. & E-HEALTH 339, 339 (2013) (“Despite the unprecedented promise, a long
history of experimentation and development, and the ever-increasing ubiquity of the
underlying technology in all sectors of modern society, the basic issues and questions
regarding the sustainability and future of telemedicine have not been fully resolved.”).
6 Sonu Bhaskar et al., Telemedicine Across the Globe-Position Paper from the COVID-19
Pandemic Health System Resilience PROGRAM (REPROGRAM) International
Consortium (Part 1), 8 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 1 (2020) (“Coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) has accelerated the adoption of telemedicine globally.”).
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In 2019, the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic superseded many of
the factors impeding the widespread use of telemedicine by forcing medical
professionals around the world to administer care remotely.7 Given the
virulence and relatively high mortality rate of COVID-19, medical distancing
(i.e., the physical separation of patients from healthcare providers) quickly
became an essential method of prevention and control from the early stages
of the outbreak.8 Forced to act quickly to reduce the impact of COVID-19,
many national governments and professional medical societies developed
guidelines to ensure the timely and successful implementation of remote
treatment options within their own countries.9 However, providing
telemedical treatment to patients across national borders presented significant
challenges.
While COVID-19 catalyzed individual nations to quickly overcome
barriers that previously restricted telemedicine as a treatment tool,
telemedicine remains underdeveloped and vastly underutilized across national
borders.10 This Note credits the dearth of international telemedicine to the lack
of international regulations governing cross-border medical care. Despite the
complex and diverging national legal framework regulating healthcare, 11
international healthcare regulations—especially those involving the treatment
of global disease—are scant. In fact, only one international legal instrument
focusing on global disease surveillance and control currently exists 12—the

7

See Telemedicine Market to Reach USD 185.66 Billion by 2026 | Global Report Size,
Share, Growth, Analysis, Forecast [2019–2026], FORTUNE BUS. INSIGHTS (Aug. 17, 2020,
7:49
AM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2020/08/17/2079161/0/en/Telemedicine-Market-to-Reach-USD-185-66-Billionby-2026-Global-Report-Size-Share-Growth-Analysis-Forecast-2019-2026.html
(anticipating 23.5% growth in global telemedicine by 2026). See Catrin Sohrabi et al.,
World Health Organization Declares Global Emergency: A Review of the 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (COVID-19), 76 INT’L J. SURGERY 71–76 (2020), for a detailed description
and overview of COVID-19.
8 Elham Monaghesh & Alireza Hajizadeh, The Role of Telehealth During COVID-19
Outbreak: A Systematic Review Based on Current Evidence, 20 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1193,
at 4 (2020).
9 Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential Health Services During the COVID-19
Pandemic, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 10, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html#edn8.
10 Maurice Mars & Richard E. Scott, Global E-Health Policy: A Work in Progress, 29
HEALTH AFFAIRS. 239, 239 (2010) (“Unfettered, routine e-health practice across domestic
and international borders currently does not exist beyond some limited agreements.”).
11
See, e.g., Robert I. Field, Why Is Health Care Regulation So Complex?, 33 PHARMACY
& THERAPEUTICS 607 (2008), (explaining reasons for the complexity in health care
regulations in the United States); Petra Maresova, New Regulations on Medical Devices in
Europe: Are They an Opportunity for Growth?, 10 ADMIN. SCIENCES, 16 (2020) (describing
medical device regulation in the EU as “complex”).
12 Andrea le Roux-Kemp, International and Operational Responses to Disease Control:
Beyond Ebola and Epistemological Confines, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 247, 264 (2018).
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World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (“IHR”).13
Although the most recent revision to the IHR is more expansive than its
predecessors, it is limited to surveillance and reporting in times of public
health emergencies of international concern (“PHEIC”).14 Cross-border
treatment through remote or other means, however, is not covered by the IHR
or any other internationally recognized agreement. The lack of an
international regulatory framework has contributed to an entrenched siloed
national approach to medical treatment, which has left practitioners—even
those who eagerly seek to develop global solutions—without guidance on
how to mitigate liability, decipher licensing restrictions, or finance remote
treatment.15 More importantly, absent an established regulatory framework,
cross-border treatment during and outside of PHEICs, like COVID-19, cannot
exist.
This Note argues that international telemedicine has no footing
without a more robust legal framework guiding healthcare providers, and
critically analyzes some of the difficulties in establishing that framework. Part
I establishes context by providing background information on telemedicine,
the limited existing international regulations, and COVID-19. Applying this
background, Part II analyzes the entrenched global and national issues that
have inhibited telemedicine from successfully being utilized across borders.
Global issues include the inadequacies of the World Health Organization’s
(“WHO”) current binding and supplemental guidelines, as well as specific
economic, social, and political turmoil usually accelerated during PHEICs.
The subsection addressing national issues analyzes two competing
approaches: (1) the current incompatible, siloed national approaches to
healthcare, and (2) a one-size-fits-all global solution that is both impracticable
and ineffective. Part III proposes solutions required to manifest change in the
current telemedicine regulatory framework and predicts changes that will
actually manifest following COVID-19. This Note concludes by briefly
discussing the vital role that telemedicine will play in the future of global
healthcare and anticipating future threats if changes to international
telemedicine regulations are not made.

13

Id.
See World Health Organization [WHO], International Health Regulations (2005) (3d
ed.) at annex 1(A)(1) (identifying “surveillance, reporting, notification, verification,
response and collaboration activities” as “core capacity requirements,” but remaining silent
on treatment).
15 Vanessa Saliba et al., Telemedicine Across Borders: A Systematic Review of Factors that
Hinder or Support Implementation, 81 INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS 793, 801 (2012).
14
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Telemedicine in Context
Because telemedicine was still a largely emerging concept in medical
practice and academic study prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the full range
of applications offered by telemedicine was undetermined.16 Although
COVID-19 catalyzed the use of telemedicine in national medical practice, the
accelerated and widespread adoption of telemedicine during the COVID-19
pandemic resulted in a similarly incomplete inventory of telemedical
applications.17 The sudden, erratic growth and novel uses of telemedicine
made implementing a universal definition of telemedicine difficult to achieve.
Therefore, it is necessary to establish a working definition of telemedicine
before discussing its regulatory framework and connection to COVID-19.
Defining telemedicine requires a brief examination of the concept’s
origin and historical development. Telemedicine originated in 1905, when a
Dutch physician and professor demonstrated the potential of
electrocardiography by transmitting the sounds of a heartbeat over a distance
of nearly one mile.18 Five years later, two American physicians developed the
electrocardiogram, which transmitted visual cardiological reports
telegraphically.19 The use of telecommunications for the purpose of medical
treatment first emerged in 1925 when radio and publishing visionary Hugo
Gernsback envisioned a device that allowed a doctor to diagnosis patients
remotely through radio.20 As innovations in radio and television expanded
over the next twenty-five years, Gernsback’s prediction was confirmed.

See Bashshur et al., supra note 5, at 339 (“[I]t has not been determined whether
telemedicine will fill only a unique niche in the health system . . . [o]r, alternatively,
whether telemedicine can be designed, implemented, accepted, and integrated as a
necessary component of the mainstream healthcare armamentarium.”).
17 INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE, supra
note 3, at 40.
18 Bashshur et al., supra note 5, at 339 (citing Willem Einthoven, The Telecardiogram, 50
NED TIJDISCHR GEENESKD 1517 (1906)). See S. Serge Barold, Willem Einthoven and the
Birth of Clinical Electrocardiography a Hundred Years Ago, 7 CARDIAC
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY REV. 99 (2003), for more information about Willem Einthoven and
electrocardiography prior to 1905.
19 Bashshur et al., supra note 5, at 339 (citing Walter B. James & Horatio B. Williams, The
Electrocardiogram in Clinical Medicine, 140 AM. J. MED. SCI. 644 (1910)).
20
Lee H. Schwamm, Telehealth: Seven Strategies to Successfully Implement Disruptive
Technology and Transform Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 200, 204 (2014). The
concept of healthcare delivery through telephone first emerged shortly after the telephone’s
invention in 1876. However, this idea languished until 1925. Scott Rupp, A Quick Look at
The
History
of
Telemedicine,
NUEMD
(Jan.
4,
2017),
https://nuemd.com/news/2017/01/04/quick-look-history-telemedicine. See also INST. OF
MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE, supra note 3, at
16
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The first reference to telemedicine in medical literature appeared in
1950, when an article described the transmission of radiologic images by
telephone across a distance of twenty-four miles in Pennsylvania.21
Expanding this growing phenomenon, radiologists at a Canadian hospital
created a teleradiology system in the 1950s, and by 1959 medical uses of video
communications in the United States began to emerge. 22 From there,
telemedicine gained traction in the clinical, academic, and rural settings. 23
During the 1970s, United States agencies and partners expanded telemedicine
through the use of cable television and satellite-based communication.24 As a
result, telemedicine expanded internationally.25 The invention of the Internet
in the 1980s further accelerated the use of telemedical treatment amongst
healthcare providers.26 Throughout the next twenty years, practitioners and
researchers expanded the application of telemedicine to a variety of treatment
contexts.27 During the start of the twenty-first century, telehealth experienced
extensive growth, and all signs indicate that this growth will continue.28

35 (highlighting the emergence of telemedicine as a concept in the mid-1920s, despite the
invention of the telephone in 1876).
21 Rupp, supra note 20; INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF
TELEMEDICINE, supra note 3, at 36.
22 See Rupp, supra note 20; (describing that by the 1950s, telemedicine had changed
significantly and discussing Nebraska’s use of telemedicine in closed-circuit televisions in
1960); INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE
supra note 3, at 36 (discussing that most historians date medical uses of video
communications in the United States to 1959).
23 See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE,
supra note 3, at 36–38 (describing that although many early telemedicine uses arose out of
concerns of lack of access in rural areas, urban uses appeared very quickly as did
educational uses).
24 INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE,
supra note 3, at 36–39.
25 See Rupp, supra note 20 (noting the use of mobile medicine in rural India hospitals);
INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE, supra
note 3, at 38–39 (discussing the partnership of federal and international agencies in testing
satellite-based communications).
26 Rupp, supra note 20.
27 Id. See also WHO, supra note 4, at 36–37 (describing “teleradiology,” “telepathology,”
“teledermatology,” and “telepsychiatry” as “four of the most popular and established areas
of telemedicine”).
28 See Michael L. Barnett et al., Trends in Telemedicine Use in a Large Commercially
Insured Population, 2005-2017, 320 JAMA 2147, 2147 (2018) (reporting an average
compound annual growth rate of 52% per year in telemedicine visits from 2005–2014); see
also Telehealth Market in US to Reach Revenues of Over $25 Billion During the Period
2020–2025 - Market Research by Arizton, CISION (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-telehealth-market-in-us-to-reachrevenues-of-over-25-billion-during-the-period-2020-2025---market-research-by-arizton301040962.html (projecting a compound annual growth rate of 30% in telehealth market
from 2020–2025).
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Telemedicine can be defined as “the remote diagnosis and treatment
of patients by means of telecommunications technology.”29 Despite this
seemingly broad definition, telemedicine is actually encapsulated within an
even broader array of digital healthcare activities and services commonly
referred to as “telehealth.”30 Telehealth “encompasses clinical health care as
well as a wide range of other services, including educating patients and
providers, and promoting disease awareness and wellness.”31 Put differently,
“telemedicine refers specifically to the practice of medicine via remote
means,” while “telehealth is a blanket term that covers all components and
activities of healthcare and the healthcare system that are conducted through
telecommunications technology.”32
Although these definitions seem straightforward, telehealth and
telemedicine lack uniformly separate definitions and are often referred to
synonymously.33 This is largely because telemedicine was first defined
broadly in the same way telehealth is used today.34 For example, in 2010 the
WHO recognized and accepted the terms telehealth and telemedicine as
synonymous.35 However, only a few years later, the term telemedicine began
receiving recognition as a subset of telehealth, and the use of
telecommunication in healthcare broadened to include nonmedical healthcare
treatment as well.36 For example, telehealth encompasses teleradiology,

29

What
Is
Telehealth?,
NEJM
CATALYST
(Feb.
1,
2018),
https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.18.0268 (categorizing telemedicine as a
subset of telehealth).
30 Id.
31 Rita M. Marcoux & F. Randy Vogenberg, Telehealth: Applications from a Legal and
Regulatory Perspective, 41 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 567, 567 (2016).
32 What is Telehealth?, supra note 29. Other terms have been used interchangeably with
telemedicine and telehealth. See Mars & Scott, supra note 10, at 239 (defining e-health as
“information and communication technology that facilitates health and health care”—a
definition very similar to telehealth).
33 Javeed Siddiqui et al., Infectious Diseases Society of America Position Statement on
Telehealth and Telemedicine as Applied to the Practice of Infectious Diseases, 64 CLINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 237, 238 (2017).
34 See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE,
supra note 3, at 27 (defining telemedicine in 1996 broadly as “the use of electronic
information and communications technologies to provide and support health care when
distance separates the participants”).
35 WHO, supra note 4, at 9. However, the WHO did note that some distinguish telemedicine
as a subset of telehealth. Id.
36
MALCOM FISK, TELEHEALTH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GERONTOLOGY & POPULATION AGING
(Danan Gu & Matthew E. Dupre eds., 2021) (recognizing that “telemedicine may be
restricted to services where physicians and health professionals are involved and, in some
cases, to exchanges of information (for the purposes of diagnoses and treatment) which do
not involve the patient,” while telehealth “will always involve the patient and can include
its use by people who have no current or specific need for diagnoses or health-related
treatments.”).
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telepathology, telepharmacology, teledentistry, and telepsychiatry, while
telemedicine is limited to medical treatment.37
The distinction between telehealth and telemedicine became even
more important given the emergence of remote treatment during COVID-19.38
Although the “remote diagnosis and treatment of patients” (i.e., telemedicine)
was utilized during the pandemic,39 the broader use of remote treatment
extends far beyond telemedicine and includes monitoring through peripheral
medical equipment, contact tracing through mobile devices, and self-check of
symptoms at home to avoid overcrowding healthcare facilities.40 Despite the
importance of maintaining the term telemedicine within the broader umbrella
of telehealth, this distinction is relatively recent and one that the international
medical community has yet to adopt.41
B. Regulatory Framework of International Telemedicine
In contrast to the intricate and often convoluted regulatory
environment characteristic of most national healthcare systems, 42 few health
regulations exist on the global front. Only one binding legal instrument exists

37

See TRACY A. LUSTIG, THE ROLE OF TELEHEALTH IN AN EVOLVING HEALTH CARE
ENVIRONMENT (2012) 13–14, 123 (discussing the practice and developments of
teleradiology, telepathology, telepharmacology, and teledentistry); WHO, supra note 4, at
36–37 (describing “teleradiology,” “telepathology,” “teledermatology,” and
“telepsychiatry” as “four of the most popular and established areas of telemedicine”).
38 See Mark Hagland, Telehealth, COVID-19, and a Suddenly Rearranged Future,
HEALTHCARE
INNOVATION
(May
20,
2020),
https://www.hcinnovationgroup.com/population-healthmanagement/telehealth/article/21138568/telehealth-covid19-and-a-suddenly-rearrangedfuture (“More has happened in the past few weeks with telehealth than in the past 20 years.
. . . COVID-19 will create a new normal, and telehealth will be a big part of that, going
forward.”).
39 What Is Telehealth?, supra note 29 and accompanying text (encapsulating telemedicine
within the broader framework of telehealth).
40 Uses of Telehealth during COVID-19 in Low Resource Non-U.S. Settings, CTRS. DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/global-covid-19/telehealth-covid19-nonUS.html#print.
41 See Siddiqui et al., supra note 33, at 238 (discussing the synonymity of definitions
utilized in the realm of remote treatment through telecommunication technology). Sources
cited throughout this Note will inevitably use the terms telemedicine and telehealth
interchangeably. However, consistent with the growing trend toward defining telemedicine
as a subset of telehealth, this Note will utilize the terms separately and will center its
analysis on the core functions of telemedicine—diagnosis and treatment—across national
borders. See What Is Telehealth?, supra note 28 (encapsulating telemedicine within the
broader framework of telehealth).
42 See Saliba et al., supra note 15, at 801 (noting the complexities of healthcare regulations
within the United States and medical device regulation in the United Kingdom).
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that regulates global disease response, prevention, and treatment—the IHR.43
Although the IHR has little impact during PHEICs, its evolution has been a
lengthy one. The IHR can be traced back to a series of “Sanitary Conferences”
that were held in 1851 to curb the spread of infectious diseases introduced
globally through trade.44 In 1892, European states created the first binding
international agreement, known then as the International Sanitary
Conferences (“ISC”).45 By 1926, the ISC had evolved to include yellow fever
and plague; however, these preventative measures were not primarily
intended to safeguard global public health.46 Rather, the ISC was mostly
limited to European countries who entered the agreement to self-protect
against health threats that might compromise national power and security.47
This purpose began to shift in 1948, when the WHO assumed control
over the ISC.48 The World Health Assembly’s expansive authority allows it
to adopt and enforce binding regulations designed to prevent the international
spread of disease.49 In 1951, the WHO exercised this broad authority to
replace the ISC with the International Sanitary Regulations and expanded the

43

Roux-Kemp, supra note 12 (describing the IHR as the only international legal
instrument that directly addresses disease surveillance and control). It is important to note
that several past and present international public health treaties outside of the IHR have
existed. See, e.g., White Lead (Painting) Convention, Nov. 19, 1921, ILO No. 13
(prohibiting use of white lead in painting); Safety Provisions (Building) Convention, June
23, 1937, ILO No. 62 (establishing safety provisions for building workers using
scaffolding and hoisting machines); Radiation Protection Convention, June 22, 1960,
I.L.O. No. 115 (establishing safety measures to protect workers against ionizing
radiation); Maximum Weight Convention, June 28, 1967, ILO No. 127 (restricting
maximum permissible weight to be carried by workers); Asbestos Convention, June 24,
1986, ILO No. 162 (imposing safety requirements for asbestos use); Safety and Health in
Construction Convention, June 20, 1988, ILO No. 167 (regulating safety and health in
construction); Chemical Convention, June 25, 1990, ILO No. 170 (imposing safety
requirements for chemical use); Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention, June 21,
2001, ILO No. 184 (regulating health and safety in agriculture). However, each of these
Conventions focus on narrow issues relating to international health and safety, usually in
the context of labor. The IHR addresses a variety of disease and methods for treatment
and prevention. As discussed below, the 2005 revisions to the IHR reflect a movement
toward even greater breadth.
44 Lawrence O. Gostin & Rebecca Katz, The International Health Regulations: The
Governing Framework for Global Health Security, 94 MILBANK Q. 264, 266 (2016).
45 Id.
46 Id. The original Sanitary Conventions and ISC specifically addressed the spread of
cholera entering Europe through Asia to protect trade. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See World Health Org. [WHO], Constitution of the World Health Organization, art. 21
(2006) https://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf. (conferring broad
authority on the World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of the WHO, to adopt
regulations aimed to slow the international spread of disease).
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agreement to cover six diseases.50 Disease-specific prevention has been the
primary goal of each revision of the IHR since it replaced the International
Sanitary Regulations in 1969.51
“[T]he emergence and pandemic potential of HIV/AIDS, the spread
of endemic diseases to new parts of the world, and outbreaks of viral
hemorrhagic fever” made clear that the 1995 revisions to the IHR were
“insufficiently flexible to respond to new infectious disease threats.” 52
Accordingly, the WHO’s revision of the IHR in 2005 aimed “to prevent,
protect against, control and provide a public health response to the
international spread of disease.”53 The 2005 revisions defined “disease” much
more broadly, to include any “illness or medical condition, irrespective of
origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans.”54
These revisions also emphasized epidemiological surveillance for the
detection and control of communicable disease outbreaks, strengthened the
national and international response to public health emergencies so that risks
inside and outside a country are managed effectively, and focused on
improving sanitation around cargo ports and airports to reduce the sources
from which infectious diseases spread.55
IHR (2005) imposed additional requirements on States Parties to
surveil disease outbreaks.56 Specifically, States Parties are “required to
develop, strengthen, and maintain core surveillance and response capacities
to detect, assess, notify, and report public health events to the WHO and
respond to public health risks and public health emergencies.” 57 These broader
requirements ensure that IHR (2005) is “better adapted to the increasing
volume and speed of international traffic and trade than were the previous
regulations and take[s] into account current trends in the epidemiology of
infectious diseases, as well as other emerging and reemerging health risks.” 58
Given its broader requirements imposed on States Parties and shift
from the “disease-specific model” of treatment to an “all-hazards strategy,”
telemedicine seems, at first glance, to be an ideal tool “to prevent, protect
against, control and provide a public health response to the international
50

Gostin & Katz, supra note 44, at 266.
Id. The IHR has been amended twice since its original publication in 1969. The second
edition of the IHR in 1995 narrowed the focus of the IHR to the three diseases originally
addressed in the ISC—cholera, plague, and yellow fever. The most recent revision of the
IHR occurred in 2005. Id. at 265.
52 Id. at 266–67.
53 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 2.
54
Id. at art. 1.
55 Max Hardiman & Annelies Wilder-Smith, The Revised International Health Regulations
and Their Relevance to Travel Medicine, 14 J. TRAVEL MED. 141, 142 (2007).
56 See WHO, supra note 14, at annex 1(A) (imposing surveillance and response
requirements on States Parties).
57 Hardiman & Wilder-Smith, supra note 55, at 142.
58 Id.
51
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spread of disease.”59 However, IHR (2005) gives little guidance on the use of
telecommunication technology as a form of international treatment. Various
reports exist60 and supplemental guidelines have emerged,61 but telemedicine
is largely unsupported by a defined regulatory framework.62 Rather, medical
professionals seeking to implement cross-border telemedicine as a method of
treatment are forced to confront “a blurry legal patchwork” that is often
difficult to decipher.63 The IHR, even after the 2005 revision, is not an
effective regulatory instrument in the field of telemedicine because it was
originally intended to provide guidance on the prevention and control of
specific diseases.64 Despite its evolution in purpose demonstrated through
revisions of the IHR, the agreement is still not designed to facilitate the use or
global implementation of telecommunication technology in medicine.65 As inperson treatment vastly subsided during COVID-19, healthcare providers
became acutely aware of the issues entrenched in the delivery of telemedical
treatment across borders.66

59

Gostin & Katz, supra note 44, at 267.
See, e.g., WHO, supra note 4 (surveying States Parties about telemedicine
implementation and application).
61 See, e.g., Statement on the Fifth Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Pandemic, WHO (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/30-10-2020-statementon-the-fifth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergencycommittee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)-pandemic (providing updated,
suggested guidelines for national and international treatment during the COVID-19
pandemic).
62 See William Ferreira & Adilene Rosales, Deciphering International Telemedicine
Regulations,
HOGAN
LOVELLS
(Apr.
13,
2020),
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/decipheringinternational-telemedicineregulations?nav=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQ71hKXzqW2Ec%3D
&key=BcJlhLtdCv6%2FJTDZxvL23TQa3JHL2AIGr93BnQjo2SkGJpG9xDX7S2thDpA
QsCconWHAwe6cJTmfSAQd2tI8D93OjGmtaEjr&uid=iZAX%2FROFT6Q%
(“[C]linicians who seek to practice remotely across borders encounter a blurry legal
patchwork from country to country.”). Although this article refers to foreign telemedicine
regulations as “international” and “across borders,” the article makes clear that “any
standardization of international telemedicine law” (i.e., the type of regulation for which
this Note advocates) “is still a long way off.” Id.
63 Id.
64 See Gostin & Katz, supra note 44, at 266.
65 Key inadequacies of the IHR are discussed at greater length in the next part of this Note.
66 See Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential Health Services during the COVID19 Pandemic, supra note 9 (describing the sudden adjustments healthcare providers had to
make during the outbreak of COVID-19).
60
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C. Telemedicine and COVID-19
The WHO declared COVID-19 a global pandemic only a few months
after recognizing the international threat that the virus posed.67 Shortly
following the pandemic declaration, the WHO recommended a number of
restrictions to slow the spread of the outbreak.68 These suggested restrictions
included, among others, reducing the amount of person-to-person contact
through social distancing, enforcing travel restrictions to and from
quarantined cities and regions, and prioritizing the health of those most at-risk
of contracting the virus (e.g., the elderly and those with underlying medical
conditions).69 As a result of these restrictions, healthcare providers were
unable to offer the same solutions in the fight against COVID-19 that they
have previously relied on during other types of natural disasters and
epidemics.70
Given the novelty and danger that COVID-19 presented, “unique and
innovative solutions” quickly became necessary, “to address both the critical
needs of patients with COVID-19 and other patients in need of healthcare
services.”71 Thus, “to facilitate optimal service delivery while minimizing the
hazard of direct person-to-person exposure” quickly became one of the
foremost needs of healthcare providers during the initial stages of the
outbreak.72
Experts suggest that telemedical technology is one of the most critical
tools that healthcare providers could use to combat COVID-19.73
Telemedicine allows physicians to video conference with patients through a
smartphone or web-cam enabled computer.74 Practitioners can conduct
COVID-19 screenings from home during times of quarantine, which promotes
social distancing.75 Moreover, specialists from around the world can interact
See Jenny Lei Ravelo & Sara Jerving, COVID-19 — A Timeline of the Coronavirus
Outbreak, DEVEX (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/covid-19-in-2020-atimeline-of-the-coronavirus-outbreak-99634 (last visited Nov. 8, 2021) (reporting that the
WHO recognized the threat of a “potential pandemic” on February 24 and “declared the
global COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic” on March 11).
68 Monaghesh & Hajizadeh, supra note 8, at 2.
69 Id. The CDC suggested similar restrictions to healthcare systems, including adjusting the
way they triage, evaluate, and care for patients using methods that do not rely on in-person
services in order to minimize the impact of patient surges on facilities. Using Telehealth
to Expand Access to Essential Health Services during the COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note
9.
70
Monaghesh & Hajizadeh, supra note 8, at 2.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Judd E. Hollander & Brendan G. Carr, Virtually Perfect? Telemedicine for Covid-19,
382 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1679, 1679 (2020).
75 Id.
67
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with patients at the touch of a button.76 Beyond the platform that telemedicine
provides doctors to consult with patients and screen for symptoms, the broader
use of telehealth expands far beyond a virtual doctor-patient interaction. For
example, through mobile applications, telehealth can provide an easy method
for contact tracing.77 COVID-19 patients can report symptoms online rather
than being confined to a hospital bed for a mere evaluation. 78 For patients
requiring hospitalization, doctors in other geographic locations could utilize
telehealth to monitor vital signs and transmit patient reports consistently and
safely.79 Each of these solutions are particularly important in developing
countries, where in-person aid is a limited resource.80
Despite the indisputable need for and advantages of telemedicine as
a treatment tool, healthcare providers quickly became aware of the deeply
entrenched issues involved in delivering remote care during COVID-19.81
From a legal perspective, practitioners are left to wade through the murky
waters of national and international regulations—or lack thereof.82 Though
regulations have relaxed to promote the widespread use of telemedicine on
the national level,83 uncertainty persists on the global front.

76

Id. at 1680.
Uses of Telehealth during COVID-19 in Low Resource Non-U.S. Settings, supra note 40.
Contact tracing is a tool used to determine whether someone who contracted a disease has
exposed anyone else before or after receiving a diagnosis.
78 Uses of Telehealth during COVID-19 in Low Resource Non-U.S. Settings, supra note 40.
79 See Vishal Nangalia et al., Health Technology Assessment Review: Remote Monitoring
of Vital Signs - Current Status and Future Challenges, 14 CRITICAL CARE 233 (2010)
(discussing the uses of telemonitoring, a telemedicine treatment tool that provides
healthcare support and service where patient and provider are physically separated).
80 See Carlo Combi et al., Telemedicine for Developing Countries: A Survey and Some
Design Issues, 7 APPLIED CLINICAL INFORMATICS 1025 (discussing the need for
telemedicine in developing countries due to the shortage of physicians). Although
technological and infrastructural barriers present prevalent challenges to delivering remote
aid, these challenges are easier to solve than the shortage of medical professionals.
81 See Kimberly Lovett Rockwell & Alexis S. Gilroy, Incorporating Telemedicine as Part
of COVID-19 Outbreak Response Systems, 26 AM J. MANAGED CARE 147 (2020)
(discussing the unique challenges involved in delivering telemedicine solutions during
COVID-19).
82 Id.
83 Id. For example, the United States expanded telemedicine service reimbursements,
relaxed technology requirements, implemented novel approaches to licensure ad
credentialing, and reduced supervision laws related to nonphysician providers. Id. at 148.
“Many European Union countries and countries in Asia have expanded laws and
regulations to permit greater adoption of telemedicine systems, provided increased
guidance on digital health technologies and cybersecurity expectations, and expanded
reimbursement options.” Id. However, Rockwell and Gilroy remain silent on the issue of
cross-border implementation. Id.
77
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The WHO, which dictates the direction of IHR, has provided some
response.84 Although this response included recommendations that seemed to
necessitate the implementation of telemedicine, the WHO did not reference
telemedicine, telehealth, or telecommunication technology in its statements.85
This left providers uncertain about how to overcome some of the complex
legal hurdles involved and asking, “Where do we go from here?”86
III. ENTRENCHED ISSUES
A. Current Global Reality
The technology underlying telemedicine has long been in place.87
Even underdeveloped and low-income countries have established the
scientific and technological means to make telemedical treatment possible and
accessible.88 Additionally, the need for telemedicine, even before the rise of
COVID-19, has long been clear. Telemedicine can increase equitable access
to quality health care, improve surveillance and treatment of communicable
and non-communicable diseases, and standardize medical training and
research.89 Telemedicine has undeniable global health advantages, especially
in developing countries. By opening a channel of transcontinental
communication and treatment between doctor and patient, medical
professionals can more effectively deliver quality healthcare to everyone, not
just citizens of developed countries.90 Yet, despite its accessibility and

84

See Statement on the Fifth Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19),
supra note 61 (providing updated, suggested guidelines for national and international
treatment during the COVID-19 pandemic).
85 Id. Recommendations included: “[c]ontinue to coordinate global and regional
multilateral organizations, partners, and networks and share best practices for responding
to the pandemic;” “[c]ontinue to strengthen capacity at points of entry to manage potential
risks of cross-border transmission and to facilitate international contact tracing;” and
“[m]aintain essential health services with sufficient funding, supplies, and human
resources.” Id. Consistent with the discrepancies in the IHR, any guidelines on the use of
telemedical treatment were absent from the supplemental recommendations.
86 See Saliba et al., supra note 15, at 801 (discussing the variety of legal issues inhibiting
the international implementation of telemedicine).
87 See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON EVALUATING CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE,
supra note 3, at 36 (dating medical uses of video communications to 1959).
88 See, e.g., WHO, supra note 4, at 16 (discussing use of telemedicine to support maternal
and newborn health in Mongolia); id. at 20 (discussing use of telemedicine to screen for
breast cancer in Mexico).
89 Saira Afzal, Telemedicine: Underutilized Tool of Global Health, 22 ANNALS KING
EDWARD MED. UNIV. 1, 1 (2016).
90 Id.
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unequivocal need, telemedicine remained nationally underutilized for
decades.91
In many ways, COVID-19 was the catalyst that accelerated the
national use of telemedical treatment. Given social and medical distancing
requirements and the mass influx of COVID-19 patients in need of critical
care, telemedicine became the only way for doctors to communicate with
patients safely.92 Hesitancy to fully adopt and incorporate remote treatment
into medical practice evaporated in light of the extreme risks that COVID-19
posed to the traditional practice of medicine. This rapid, forced adoption of
telemedicine into mainstream practice was largely contrived under an actnow-plan-later approach, which will likely accelerate the long-term
implementation of telemedicine on the national level.93 Despite its role in
opening the door for national telemedicine, COVID-19 did not reduce
uncertainty about the use of telemedicine on the global front. Instead, it
revealed two significant issues in international healthcare governance during
PHEICs: (1) the deficiencies of the IHR and supplemental regulations by the
WHO, and (2) the economic, social, and political turmoil fueled by a siloed
national approach to healthcare.
i.

Deficiencies of the IHR and Supplemental
Recommendations

The IHR fails to provide guidance on telemedical treatment for
several reasons. The foremost reason is that the IHR—even its most recent
revision in 2005—is still too narrow in scope to ensure effective and efficient
global treatment, even during PHEICs. The 2005 revision significantly
broadened the IHR in scope. Rather than focusing on response to specific
diseases, like previous versions of the IHR, the 2005 revision of the IHR was
designed “to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate
with and restricted to public health risks.”94 Despite this critical expansion to
any event that could be considered a PHEIC, the recommended response to
these public health emergencies provided by the IHR is far too limited. 95

91

Bashshur et al., supra note 5, at 339.

92 See Monaghesh & Hajizadeh, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing social distancing and medical

distancing as preventative measure to reduce transmission of COVID-19).
93 That is not to say that telemedicine was haphazardly adopted as a national treatment
solution during COVID-19. Rather, practitioners were forced to quickly implement the
already-existing telemedical framework into mainstream medical practice, notwithstanding
the barriers that previously inhibited telemedicine from widespread use on the national
level. See Kruse et al., supra note 4, for an overview of the barriers to telemedicine on the
national level prior to COVID-19.
94 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 2.
95 Id. at art. 1.
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While the IHR emphasizes surveillance and communication between States
Parties, the IHR provides few universal guidelines for treatment during
PHEICs.96 Rather, the IHR expressly delegates this responsibility to States
Parties, who are afforded broad discretion on how to respond to PHEICs. 97
States must still “uphold the purpose” of the regulations, but are otherwise
granted “the sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in
pursuance of their health policies.”98 Without robust, universal guidelines for
treatment, collaboration between countries to slow the spread of diseases
becomes ineffective. A country might implement telemedicine as a part of
their national treatment strategy, but absent international guidelines
promoting and organizing cross-border use, it is up to individual nations to
determine whether and how to implement mobile treatment beyond its
borders.99 This is particularly difficult for States Parties to accomplish during
PHEICs, when information about the threat is incomplete and, especially in
the case of COVID-19, growth of the threat is imminent.100
Second, the IHR, despite its legally binding status, lacks authority to
regulate the treatment strategies that States Parties implement. Although the
IHR requires States Parties to “develop, strengthen and maintain” a strategy
to quickly respond to PHEICs,101 these requirements focus on “surveillance,
See id. at art. 1 (omitting “treatment” or similar terminology from “Definitions” section);
id. at Part II (requiring States Parties to participate in surveillance, notification,
information-sharing, consultation with the WHO, reporting, and verification, but
remaining silent on treatment); id. at annex 1(a)(1) (identifying “surveillance, reporting,
notification, verification, response and collaboration activities” as “core capacity
requirements,” but remaining silent on treatment).
97 See, e.g., id. at art. 13(1) (“Each State Party shall develop, strengthen and maintain . . .
the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health
emergencies or international concern”); id. at art. 16 (“[Nonbinding] standing
recommendations of appropriate health measures . . . may be applied by States Parties
regarding . . . specific ongoing public health risks in order to prevent or reduce the
international spread of disease and avoid unnecessary interference with international
traffic.” (emphasis added)); id. at art. 21(2) (recommending, but not requiring, States
Parties sharing common borders to consider implementing ground crossing agreements);
id. at art. 23 (recommending, but not requiring, health measures on arrival and departure);
id. at art. 43(1) (“These Regulations shall not preclude States Parties from implementing
health measures, in accordance with their relevant national law and obligations under
international law, in response to specific public health risks or public health emergencies
of international concern.”).
98 Id. at art. 3(4).
99 Id. at art. 43(1) (“These Regulations shall not preclude States Parties from implementing
health measures, in accordance with their relevant national law and obligations under
international law, in response to specific public health risks or public health emergencies
of international concern.”).
100 See Zeinab Abdelrahman et al., Comparative Review of SARS-CoV-2, SARS-Cov,
MERS-Cov, and Influenza A Respiratory Viruses, 11 FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY 1, 2 (2020)
(discussing the rapid growth of COVID-19 compared to previous similar outbreaks).
101 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 13(1).
96
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reporting, notification, verification, response and collaboration activities”
rather than treatment.102 Many of the recommendations that the IHR allows
the WHO to issue during PHEICs are explicitly “non-binding,”103 leaving
States Parties the authority to respond in ways exclusive to their own national
interests. Similar issues arise with “weak” requirements within the IHR
itself.104 For example, Article 44 of the IHR requires States Parties to
collaborate in detecting and responding to events, facilitating technical and
logistic support, mobilizing financial resources, and formulating laws. 105
However, the IHR significantly weakens the mandatory “shall” language of
these requirements by preceding them with “to the extent possible.”106 There
are a myriad of reasons a nation could contrive to explain why collaboration
with and syphoning resources to other nations during PHEICs—usually the
times of greatest economic, social, and political turmoil for many nations—is
not possible.
Further, while States Parties are legally obligated to comply with the
IHR’s surveillance and response requirements, the WHO has no punitive
power to ensure compliance.107 There is no formal penalty for failure to notify
the WHO of a potential PHEIC, or for failure to achieve core capacities for
surveillance, reporting, and response.108 Rather, cooperation with the IHR
depends on the trust that Member States have in the WHO and other national
governments.109 That trust is difficult to maintain during the uncertainty of a
PHEIC. For example, China became the target of global criticism for its role
in masking the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic to the WHO and other
world leaders.110 China even took “legal measures” against eight doctors who
shared information with WHO officials about the emerging threat posed by
COVID-19.111 Despite the Chinese government’s awareness of the virus’s
human-to-human transmission, Chinese officials waited to place Wuhan—
COVID-19’s city of origin—on lockdown until January 23, 2020, days after
102

Id. at annex 1(A)(1)(a).
Id. at art. 1 (defining temporary recommendations and standing recommendations as
“non-binding advice”).
104 See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations:
An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 34 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 85, 88 (2006) (describing certain provisions of the IHR as “weak”).
105 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 44(1).
106 Id. at art. 44(2).
107 Rebecca L. Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A
Framework for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 1, 12 (2009).
108
Id.
109 Id.
110 See Jabin T. Jacob, ‘To Tell China’s Story Well’: China’s International Messaging
During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 56 CHINA REP. 374 (2020) (examining China’s coverups to the origins of COVID-19 and its external propaganda effort to repair damage to its
global image and interests).
111 Id. at 377.
103
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China’s Lunar New Year holidays were well underway.112 Approximately
five million people left the city without being screened by the time China
implemented containment efforts.113 This situation illustrates the cascading
effect of the unenforceable requirements that the IHR impose. Without some
significant deterrent driving compliance with the reporting requirements,
China sought to protect its own economic and global political interests over
the interests of other States Parties. This made it more difficult for States
Parties to comply with other IHR requirements, like collaborating during
PHEICs,114 considering the public distrust of China by citizens and
governments of many nations.115
Third, the IHR in some instances conflicts with and restricts effective
national response. For example, Article 43 of the IHR restricts measures that
countries can implement to measures that are supported by science,
commensurate with the risks involved, and anchored in human rights.116 This
restriction intends to prevent States Parties from taking needless measures that
harm people or that disincentivize countries from reporting new public health
risks to international authorities.117 On its face, this restriction seems
beneficial. However, during novel disease outbreaks, when there are many
unknown risks and high populist pressures on national governments, these
restrictions can be impracticable and sometimes counterproductive. In early
2020, many countries were critiqued for violating the IHR after imposing
travel restrictions during the early stages of COVID-19.118 The WHO itself
112

Id.
Id.
114 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 44(1).
115 See, e.g., Laura Silver et al., Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of
COVID-19,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(July
30,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-inthe-spread-of-covid-19/ (reporting 78% of Americans “place a great deal or fair amount of
the blame for the global spread of the coronavirus on the Chinese government’s initial
handling of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan”).
116 Roojin Habibi et al., Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations During the
COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 LANCET 664, 664 (2020) (citing IHR Article 43).
117 Id. WHO data also indicate that travel restrictions have only limited effectiveness in
slowing the spread of a disease outbreak. Ana LP Mateus et al., Effectiveness of Travel
Restrictions in the Rapid Containment of Human Influenza: A Systematic Review, 92
BULLETIN WORLD HEALTH ORG. 868, 873 (2014). Research shows that “[o]nly extensive
travel restrictions – i.e. over 90% – had any meaningful effect on reducing the magnitude
of epidemics.” Id.
118
Habibi et al., supra note 116, at 664. Critiques were made after reaching “a
jurisprudential consensus on the legal meaning of IHR Article 43.” Id. Scholars argued that
(1) travel restrictions violated Article 43(2) because they were not grounded in “scientific
principles,” “scientific evidence,” or “advice from WHO”; (2) restrictions were more
critical of international traffic and more invasive and intrusive to persons than reasonably
available alternatives, in violation of Article 43(1); and (3) the restrictions violated Article
3.1—which requires all additional health measures to be implemented “with full respect
113
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even advised against the application of travel or trade restrictions to countries
experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks.119 However, contradicting research later
suggested that early travel restrictions were highly effective for containing the
COVID-19 epidemic in some countries.120 This conflicting direction not only
reduces the trust that Member States have in the WHO and IHR, but also
decreases the likelihood that States will coordinate with one another to
develop and implement a uniform response.
Supplemental guidelines proposed by the WHO during PHEICs are
similarly ineffective and potentially counterproductive. When the WHO
declares a PHEIC, it has the power to issue temporary recommendations that
advise States Parties to implement specific measures to prevent or reduce the
international spread of disease.121 However, as previously discussed, these
temporary recommendations are expressly “non-binding,”122 leaving States to
determine whether and to what extent they will implement this supplemental
advice.123
Pursuant to IHR Article 15, the WHO issued temporary
recommendations throughout various stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.124
These recommendations consisted of guidelines for research, surveillance,
contact tracing, and national regulation.125 However, any recommendations
regarding treatment simply reinforced siloed national action over a
collaborative, cross-border solution.126 Not only do these recommendations
for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons”—because they
primarily restricted travel to China, the supposed source of Coronavirus. Id. See also
Muhammad Adnan Shereen et al., COVID-19 Infection: Origin, Transmission, and
Characteristics of Human Coronaviruses, 24 J. ADVANCED RES. 91, 91 (2020) (identifying
Wuhan, China as the source of the Coronavirus outbreak).
119 Updated WHO Recommendations for International Traffic in Relation to COVID-19
Outbreak, WHO (Feb 29, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/updatedwho-recommendations-for-international-traffic-in-relation-to-covid-19-outbreak.
120 See Valentina Constantino et al., The Effectiveness of Full and Partial Bans Against
COVID-19 Spread in Australia for Travellers from China During and After the Epidemic
Peak in China, 27 J. TRAVEL MED. 1, 2 (2020) (indicating that the full travel ban Australia
imposed on China on February 1, 2020 reduced Australian COVID-19 cases by
approximately 86%).
121 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 15.
122 Id. at art. 1 (defining temporary and standing recommendations as “non-binding
advice”).
123 See Katz & Fischer, supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the WHO’s lack
of authority over States’ response to recommendations).
124 See, e.g., Statement on the Fifth Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19),
supra note 61 (providing updated, suggested guidelines for national and international
treatment during the COVID-19 pandemic).
125 Id.
126 For example, the WHO recommended States Parties to “[e]ngage and empower
individuals and communities to strengthen confidence in the COVID-19 response,”
“[e]stablish a national multi-disciplinary taskforce” to assist with vaccine introduction and
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fail to mention or suggest telemedicine as form of treatment, but the
recommendations also emphasize national and local response rather than
coordination between States.127 Given the economic, social, and political
turmoil during PHEICs, emphasizing national and local response can result in
damage to a cooperative global effort.
ii.

Economic, Social, and Political Turmoil

Economic, social, and political pressures that occur in various States
during PHEICs also reduce the likelihood that States will commit to
compliance with the IHR and supplemental recommendations or will
collaborate with other States to develop new treatment options. Because
citizens look to their own national governments rather than international
organizations to provide aid and immediate leadership during times of global
emergency, States’ responses are often tailored around the needs of their own
citizens rather than the needs of the global community. This type of national
response is usually not callous or ill-intended. Indeed, it is logical for national
leaders to prioritize the economic, social, and political needs of their own
countries during PHEICs, since they—rather than world leaders—will be held
directly accountable by their citizens for any negative economic, social, or
political fallout. This heightened sense of national autonomy is particularly
counterproductive to the formation of a global treatment strategy, even one
that is entirely remote. This reality became brutally apparent during COVID19.
The economic disruption caused by COVID-19 was devastating. As
national economies dramatically slowed, tens of millions around the globe
risked falling into extreme poverty, nearly half of the world’s 3.3 billion
global workforce faced losing their livelihoods, and domestic and
international food supply chains became fragile.128 Reduction in productivity
after the initial outbreak caused disruptions in the global supply chain and
factory closures worldwide.129 Consumer spending behavior decreased,
primarily due to decreased income and household finances, as well as fear and
panic that accompanied the early stages of COVID-19.130 International travel
distribution, and “invest in implementing National Action Plans for sustainable
preparedness and response.” Id. (emphasis added).
127 Id.
128 Impact of COVID-19 on People’s Livelihoods, Their Health and our Food Systems,
WHO (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19on-people%27s-livelihoods-their-health-and-our-food-systems.
129 Anton Pak et al., Economic Consequences of the COVID-19 Outbreak: The Need for
Epidemic Preparedness, 8 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2020). For example, the
production index in China in February 2020 declined by more than 54% from the preceding
month’s value. Id.
130 Id.
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restrictions, although mitigating the spread of COVID-19, significantly
hindered global economic growth and development.131
Similarly, COVID-19 imposed new social pressures on citizens
worldwide. Suddenly, individuals were expected to transform their ways of
life to mitigate the risks of the virus while continuing to deal with the normal
challenges of everyday living. One of the primary ways of combatting the
disease—social distancing—drove many into complete isolation, keeping
them physically safe but psychologically and relationally at risk. 132 Imposing
these types of restrictions often placed national leaders in the difficult position
of juxtaposing psychological needs that are usually non-competing: the need
for self-protection and need for social affiliation.133
Perceived risk also varied widely based on national social and
cultural structure. Research suggests that members of collectivists countries,
such as China and Italy, showed more concern about COVID-19, especially
in the beginning stages of the outbreak.134 In contrast, highly individualistic
countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, demonstrated a
higher risk tolerance from the early stages of the virus.135 This cultural
discrepancy resulted in wide variations in the types of restrictions that national
governments imposed during COVID-19.136
The political pressure exerted on many government leaders led to
national actions discouraged by the WHO and in violation of IHR. 137 In some
instances, political pressures even caused national leaders to blame the WHO
when the global course of action contradicted national response. For example,
under the Trump Administration, the U.S. signaled in mid-2020 that it would
eliminate funding to and ultimately withdraw from the WHO as its death toll

131

Id.
See Thiago Matias et al., Human Needs in COVID-19 Isolation, 25 J. HEALTH PSYCH.
871, 872 (2020) (discussing the negative psychological effects of the COVID-19
lockdown).
133 Id. at 875–76.
134 Alessandro Germani et al., Emerging Adults and COVID-19: The Role of IndividualismCollectivism on Perceived Risks and Psychological Maladjustment, 17 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES.
& PUB. HEALTH 1, 10 (2020).
135 See Simon Marginson, The Relentless Price of High Individualism in the Pandemic, 39
HIGHER EDUC. ERES. & DEV. 1392, 1392 (2020) (contrasting resistance to restraints of
individual freedom in the U.S. and UK with strict regulation and self-regulation of East
Asian countries during COVID-19).
136 For example, Italy imposed a mandatory lockdown in early March 2020 without
significant pushback from citizens. Germani et al., supra note 134, at 10, 12. However, the
U.S. and UK showed a “reluctan[ce] to close down and eager[ness] to reopen prematurely.”
Marginson, supra note 135, at 1392.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 116–20 (discussing conflicts between IHR
guidelines and national responses during COVID-19).
132
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from COVID-19 mounted.138 A decision critiqued by many national and
global scholars and pundits, President Trump’s withdrawal from the WHO
signaled distrust in the WHO’s efforts to curb the spread of the virus.139 This
action also signaled mistrust of other States Parties. President Trump’s
criticism of the WHO centered around its failure to investigate China as the
source of the disease.140 Trump “accused Beijing of hiding the true scope of
infections from the W.H.O., targeting the agency in the process.”141 Not only
did statements and actions like these further cripple the cooperative response
necessary to develop and implement effective global treatment, but they also
risked rooting similar sentiments of divisiveness in citizens of other nations,
which placed unnecessary burdens on countries attempting to establish
measures for effective cross-border treatment. This carried the risk of
accelerating populist concern over important international governance
arrangements, like the IHR, that are essential to an effective global response
to COVID-19 and other PHEICs.142
The economic, social, and political turmoil during PHEICs inhibits a
more effective global response. In the case of COVID-19, these issues
contributed to the inaccessibility of telemedicine across borders. National
leaders and agencies quickly became so consumed with resolving the
immediate turmoil disrupting their own countries that they failed to develop
the infrastructure for remote treatment on the national level. However, this
intrinsic failure does not reside within individual nations, but within global
138

Katie Rogers & Apoorva Mandevilli, Trump Administration Signals Formal
Withdrawal
from
W.H.O.,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(July
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who.html.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. When he announced the United States’ withdrawal from the WHO, Trump went as
far as stating, “The world is now suffering as a result of the malfeasance of the Chinese
government.” Id.
142 Kumanan Wilson et al., The International Health Regulations (2005), the Threat of
Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 16 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1, 2 (2020).
“Populism refers to movements which appeal to local population who believe their needs
are not prioritized by ruling elites.” Id. Countries around the world displayed varying
degrees of populism during the response to COVID-19, especially in the beginning stages.
Id. at 3. For example, many states have accused the WHO of delaying the declaration of a
PHEIC and have circumvented the WHO’s recommendations to implement travel
restrictions that exceeded the scope permissible under the IHR. Id. Populist sentiments
were obvious in the United States, which ceased funding and withdrew from the WHO.
Id.; Rogers & Mandevilli, supra note 138. Other countries, fueled by populist sentiment
and reluctance to trust global entities, entirely circumvented the WHO’s recommended
response and charted their own path. Id. For example, Brazil and the UK adopted a “herd
immunity” strategy rather than the “lockdown” strategy suggested by WHO
recommendations. Id. These wide variations in national response further complicated
international cooperation and made treatment—including remote treatment—across
national borders unfeasible.

2022]

TELEMEDICINE ACROSS BORDERS

585

leadership. After all, the immediate response to PHEICs by national leaders
is to prioritize the best course of action for those who hold them directly
accountable—their own citizens. This leaves the WHO and other international
organizations with the responsibility of ensuring a cooperative global
solution. However, while COVID-19 greatly stimulated the use of
telemedicine at the national level,143 international use of telemedicine
stagnated because the existing regulatory framework offers no guidance on
implementing treatment.144 Rather, the WHO has explicitly delegated the
responsibility of incorporating global treatment solutions to the States, whose
primary concern during PHEICs is its own citizens.145 In doing so, the WHO
fails to recognize the depth and effects of national turmoil during PHEICs and
imposes expectations on States Parties (e.g., to collaborate with other States
to respond to PHEICs)146 that have a low probability of compliance and only
work to cement a siloed and autonomous approach to healthcare.
The current state of the international regulatory framework, as
demonstrated by COVID-19, is characterized by patent weaknesses in the IHR
and supplemental recommendations, and its rippling economic, social, and
political impact on States. These systemic global issues shed light on why the
implementation of telemedicine as a global treatment tool has largely failed,
both prior to and during the COVID-19 outbreak. Countries have struggled to
provide telemedical treatment across borders because the international
framework—which provides no guidance on telemedicine—is silent on the
development of possible treatment and how to implement said treatment,
nationally or globally. Rather, treatment development is left to the States,
whose siloed approaches impede the growth of telemedicine on the global
front.
B. National Barriers to Telemedicine
The international framework regulating healthcare is dependent the
regulatory schemes of individual States, each of which is responsible for
devising and maintaining its own response to treatment.147 Thus, the extent to
which individual nations choose to utilize remote treatment options is outside
the bounds of any international control or concern. Accordingly, utilizing and
143

Bhaskar, supra note 6, at 1.
accompanying notes 96–100 (discussing the IHR’s ineffective delegation
of treatment to States Parties).
145
See supra text accompanying notes 101–06 (discussing the lack of treatment
requirements imposed on States Parties by the IHR and supplemental recommendations).
146 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 44(1).
147 See JESSICA A. HOHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS PRIMER 2 (Kao-Ping
Chua ed. 2006) (“The study of international healthcare systems inevitably reveals stark and
intriguing contrasts, which have at their root an individual country's unique set of economic
and social values.”).
144 See supra text
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implementing telemedicine across borders is largely the responsibility of
States. However, until COVID-19, telemedicine was merely an emerging
treatment tool, even in developed nations.148 The slow growth and
underutilization of telemedicine within individual nations has hampered
telemedicine’s development on the global front. Although many factors
contribute to the slow national growth of telemedicine, the most significant
issue centers on the underlying healthcare regulatory environment of each
State. Therefore, it is important to analyze each national model of healthcare
before arriving at a global solution.
i.

Incompatible Models of National Healthcare

National healthcare systems can be categorized into four basic
models: the Beveridge Model, the Bismarck Model, the National Health
Insurance Model, and the Out-of-Pocket Model.149 The Beveridge Model,
implemented in countries such as the UK, Spain, Scandinavia, and New
Zealand, is a type of “socialized medicine” that is premised on the basic
principle that healthcare is a basic human right.150 Under the Beveridge
Model, “health care is provided and financed by the government through tax
payments,” just like the police force, public library system, and other public
utilities.151 The government owns many hospitals and clinics, and some
healthcare professionals are government employees;152 private doctors who
are not directly employed by the government collect fees from the
government.153 Because the government acts as the sole payer in the
healthcare industry, it controls what healthcare providers can do, how much
they can charge, and the types of research and treatment they can develop and
implement.154 Another practical concern of the Beveridge Model is that
governmental response to crises, such as public health emergencies, is
148

Bashshur et al., supra note 5, at 339.
Lorraine S. Wallace, A View of Health Care Around the World, 11 ANNALS FAMILY
MED. 84, 84 (2013). Some scholars suggest that national healthcare systems are not limited
to the four listed here. However, because these four best encapsulate the differences
between healthcare systems, this Note will use them to briefly differentiate the types of
national healthcare systems. It is also important to note that some countries, such as the
United States, do not fall into one single system, but rather share characteristics of all four
systems.
150 T. R. Reid, Four Basic Models of Health Care, CHANGE AGENT 26 (2009),
https://changeagent.nelrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Four-Basic-Models-of-HealthCare.pdf; HOHMAN, supra note 147, at 23.
151 Reid, supra note 150. “General taxation funds approximately 80%” of healthcare in the
UK; the remainder is funded through national insurance companies’ contributions and
small patient fees. HOHMAN, supra note 147, at 24.
152 Reid, supra note 150, at 26.
153 Id.
154 Id.
149
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severely limited.155 If a national or global crisis arises that places economic
strains on taxpayers—the primary source of healthcare financing—publicly
provided health services may decline, placing hardships on the whole
system.156
Somewhat related is the Bismarck Model, which is found in
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and some
Latin American States.157 The Bismarck Model relies upon an insurance
system that is “usually financed jointly by employers and employees through
payroll deduction.”158 Additionally, unlike the Beveridge single-payer
framework, health providers are generally private institutions.159 Despite this
privatization, the healthcare industry is still closely regulated by the
government, which impacts the extent to which healthcare providers can
implement and fund new forms of treatment.160 Moreover, because treatment
is funded by and prioritized for employed citizens, providing care for the
unemployed, elderly, or those unable to afford contributions presents a
practical concern.161
The National Health Insurance Model, commonly found in Canada,
Taiwan, and South Korea, combines publicly funded, mandated universal
healthcare with largely private delivery mechanisms.162 This model primarily
consists of private-sector providers, but payment comes through governmentrun insurance programs to which each citizen is required to contribute.163 The
National Health Insurance Model is more financially viable and less
administratively complex.164 As the single payer, the government has the
market power to negotiate for lower prices, but it also has considerable control
over the types of services healthcare providers are able to render.165 This often
results in limited medical services or extensive waitlists for treatment, 166

155

Mimi Chung, Health Care Reform: Learning from Other Major Health Care Systems
(Dec.
2,
2017),
PRINCETON
PUB.
HEALTH
REV.,
https://pphr.princeton.edu/2017/12/02/unhealthy-health-care-a-cursory-overview-ofmajor-health-care-systems.
156 Id.
157 Reid, supra note 150, at 26.
158 Id.
159 Id.; Chung, supra note 155. The number of insurers differs by country. “In some
countries, there is a single insurer (France, Korea); other countries may have multiple,
competing insurers (Germany, Czech Republic) or multiple, non-competing insurers
(Japan).” Id.
160
Chung, supra note 155.
161 Id.
162 HOHMAN, supra note 147, at 7; Reid, supra note 150, at 26.
163 Reid, supra note 150, at 26.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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which has fueled the phenomenon of “medical tourism” (i.e., international
travel for the purpose of medical treatment).167
Lastly, the Out-of-Pocket Model is the found throughout most of the
world.168 This model is used in countries that are too poor or disorganized to
provide national healthcare.169 In these countries, only those who can pay
directly for healthcare treatment can obtain it.170 “In rural regions of Africa,
India, China, and South America, hundreds of millions go their entire lives
without ever seeing a doctor,” simply because it is not financially possible. 171
The Out-of-Pocket Model is particularly problematic for aging populations,
who require more medical treatment with less ability to pay. Additionally,
during times of emergency or economic strain, those who can afford
healthcare must often prioritize treatment over other basic necessities.
Given the wide disparities in the organizational structures, financing,
quality of and access to treatment, and systemic problems in each of these four
national healthcare systems, failure to implement a global solution for
telemedicine is unsurprising. Among the myriad of barriers, two predominate
issues have inhibited telemedicine from successfully crossing national
borders: payment structures and licensing conflicts. Payment structure
concerns payers of care while licensing conflicts center around providers of
care. Inconsistencies that run rampant from country to country in each of these
issues make it difficult for States to develop and implement short and longterm treatment solutions that meet the needs of citizens in both local and
global populations.
Beginning with payment structures, healthcare treatment—including
remote treatment—is not free, regardless of whether the government is the
single payer or payers are completely individualized. Accordingly, financing
issues arise regardless of whether treatment is provided remotely or in-person.
Someone still must pay for telemedical examinations, diagnoses, and
treatments. To illustrate, if a Canadian citizen who is traditionally covered
under a government-structured insurance plan172 seeks a teleconsultation with
a doctor in the United Kingdom, who are normally employed and paid by the
government,173 a complex question arises: who gets paid by whom? Should
the Canadian Government be expected to fund the cross-border telemedical
treatment, or should the United Kingdom look to its citizens or the Canadian
See Leigh Turner, “Medical Tourism” and the Global Marketplace in Health Services:
U.S. Patients, International Hospitals, and the Search for Affordable Health Care, 40 INT’L
J. HEALTH SERVS. 443 (2010), for an interesting examination of medical tourism and its
effect on global healthcare.
168 Wallace, supra note 149, at 84.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Reid, supra note 150, at 26.
173 Id.
167
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Government to cover the costs of treatment? Similar issues arise even between
countries who use the same healthcare model.174 For example, if a British
doctor were providing telemedical treatment to a New Zealand patient, is the
New Zealand Government required to fund treatment by the British healthcare
provider? National healthcare regulations are often unclear. This is especially
true in countries like the United States, where healthcare treatment is largely
financed through private insurance.175 Although the Out-of-Pocket Model,
which is less constricted by government control and strict regulation, presents
an easier route for cross-border treatment, healthcare providers in Out-ofPocket countries usually lack the most up-to-date technology and
infrastructure to effectively facilitate telemedicine.176 Rather, Out-of-Pocket
Model countries usually depend on developed countries to provide
humanitarian intervention because they lack adequate treatment options.177
Even healthcare providers who provide cross-border humanitarian aid are still
constrained by licensure restrictions.

174

Similar problems even arise in different regions of the same country. For example, in
the United States, each state’s laws, regulations, and Medicaid program policies differ
significantly, making it difficult for healthcare providers to agree upon reimbursement rates
for telemedical treatment. CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POLICY, STATE TELEHEALTH
LAWS & REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES 2 (2019). Although all fifty states and Washington D.C.
provide some form of live video medical consultation service in Medicaid plans,
reimbursement of telemedical services beyond live video differs from state to state. Id. at
2–3. States laws regulating actions of private insurers also differ from state to state, further
complicating individual access to telemedicine. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.4
(2020) (requiring payment parity between telemedicine and in-person services in Georgia),
with FLA. STAT. 641.31 (2019) (permitting payments initiated between telehealth-delivered
services and in-person services to differ in Florida). These complex and ever-changing
state requirements often make it difficult for patients from one state to seek remote
treatment in another, even though the infrastructure and technology for telemedicine has
long been in place. Additionally, states’ attempts to equate telemedicine with in-person
treatment to expand access to care is somewhat counterproductive because they impede
patients from seeking telemedical treatment across state borders. Payment problems in the
United States are illustrative of reimbursement issues globally. Like the incompatible and
complex state reimbursement requirements, incompatible national healthcare schemes are
not designed to facilitate cooperative reimbursement solutions across national borders.
Unlike the U.S., however, which maintains some consistency by exerting some federal
control over state action, the global scheme lacks any form of uniformity by international
bodies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (2014) (outlining Medicaid funding requirements
for states); H.R. 7078, 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing study to evaluate changes to
telehealth under Medicare and Medicaid programs during COVID-19).
175
HOHMAN, supra note 147, at 27.
176 This is largely because the Out-of-Pocket countries are usually some of the poorest and
most underdeveloped. Wallace, supra note 149, at 84.
177 See Christophe Paquet, The Big Challenge is to Improve Poor Countries’ Health Care
Systems, AFD (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.afd.fr/en/actualites/big-challenge-improvepoor-countries-health-care-systems-christophe-paquet (discussing various assistance
programs used to increase access to medical treatment in impoverished countries).
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Like the problems presented by diverging payment structures, the
licensing schemes by which healthcare providers must abide are inconsistent
from country to county. If licensing restrictions prohibit doctors from legally
providing treatment to patients in different countries, treatment by healthcare
providers across borders becomes largely unfeasible and sometimes
impossible. Medical licensing is a necessary evil. Without stringent licensing
requirements, physicians with inadequate training or experience could
misdiagnose or mistreat patients, inadvertently causing serious injury or
death. This type of inaccuracy can be detrimental during PHEICs. However,
if States enforce licensing restrictions without exceptions, it will be
impossible for telemedicine to take any meaningful form. Individual States
internally relaxed licensing restrictions during COVID-19 to allow for more
effective national responses to the virus. For example, the United States
demonstrated “extraordinary flexibility by temporarily waiving or modifying
medical licensure requirements to meet the needs of the nation.” 178 By
relaxing license requirements, the United States increased access to
telemedicine across state lines.179 Similar flexibility on the global level
between world leaders is an essential part of facilitating global treatment
across borders.
ii.

The Impractical One-Size-Fits-All Solution

Some suggest a “one-size-fits-all” solution to these two primary
barriers to telemedicine. Under a “one-size-fits-all” solution, countries would
subscribe to a uniform regulatory framework that oversees the clinical,
operational, ethical, financial, and licensure of telemedicine as it is used across
borders.180 Although this one-size-fits-all approach would certainly present an
ideal solution to the complex problems that the global implementation of
telemedicine presents, this solution is simply not appropriate or practical
enough to garner serious support for two key reasons.
First, national healthcare regulatory schemes are too diverse and
complex to assimilate into a single, uniform regulatory body. Beyond the
payment structure and licensing issues that permeate national healthcare
markets lie differing standards on a variety of additional issues, such as
consent to care, quality of care, ethical guidelines, professional associations,
and data and privacy protection.181 Legislative barriers also present additional
178

Anita Slomski, Telehealth Success Spurs a Call for Greater Post–COVID-19 License
Portability, 324 JAMA 1021, 1021 (2020).
179 Id.
180 See Maurice Mars & Caron Jack, Why Is Telemedicine a Challenge to the Regulators?,
3 S. AFR. J. BIOETHICS & L. 55, 55 (2010) (introducing a one-size-fits-all approach to
national healthcare systems and discussing the shortcomings of such a system).
181 Id.
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issues in many countries. Comprehensive national reform to the extent
necessary to provide a uniform global cooperative telemedicine system would
require legislative action that could take years.182 This is especially true with
legislation that is as important and controversial as healthcare. The
implementation of telemedicine, an emerging treatment tool that has only
recently started to garner widespread use, has and will continue to provide
uncertainties likely to slow any prospect of international implementation. 183
Second, current international regulations are not designed to
introduce, maintain, or enforce a one-size-fits-all solution. The only current
international regulation that could apply to telemedicine treatment across
borders is the IHR. However, the IHR, given its current limited purpose and
scope, is not designed to regulate telemedical treatment across borders, much
less contrive an entire system supporting global telemedicine.184 Instead, the
IHR reinforces the siloed national approach to healthcare by leaving the
development and implementation of treatment completely up to States
Parties.185 Although the IHR gives the WHO the authority to recommend
treatment options, complying with these recommendations and implementing
a treatment strategy is almost exclusively up to the States.186 Further, even if
the IHR did provide a uniform one-size-fits-all solution, the WHO would
possess no actual authority to hold Member States to this agreement, even if
the agreement was “binding” in name.187 This is especially true during
PHEICs, when the priorities of States Parties center around its citizens.

182

For example, it took nearly two years for the Affordable Care Act to be signed into law
after it was introduced in the United States. Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law,
CNN (June 28, 2012, 10:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/politics/supremecourt-health-timeline/index.html. And even after passing, a constitution battle over the
Affordable Care Act continued for years. See National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (deciding the constitutionality of certain provisions within
the Affordable Care Act). The amount of time it would take each country to pass legislation
that would allow a global telemedicine plan to move forward would likely be prohibitive.
183 For example, India tried to pass a comprehensive law regulating telemedicine
nationally, but the proposed bill was never enacted because lawmakers could not agree on
several key provisions, including domestic and international licensure, liability protocols,
and limitations on doctor-patient communication. Mars & Jack, supra note 180, at 56.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 96–100 (discussing the lack of treatment
requirements imposed on States Parties by the IHR and supplemental recommendations).
185
WHO, supra note 14, at 1.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 101–106 (discussing the limits of the WHO’s
authority over specific treatment and the explicit delegation by the IHR to states to devise
their own siloed, national solutions).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 118–120 (discussing deviations from WHO
recommendations and IHR requirements by several countries during the initial stages of
the COVID-19 outbreak).
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IV. NECESSARY SOLUTIONS
Significant entrenched global and national issues have impeded the
implementation of a regulatory framework governing international
telemedicine. To ensure the success of that framework in the future, the
international community must tailor comprehensive solutions to address the
significant barriers inhibiting telemedicine from becoming an internationally
utilized treatment tool. Given the exposure that COVID-19 shed on those
barriers, global healthcare reform is gaining the momentum necessary to
create a framework for cross-border telemedicine. However, as explained
above, these issues are deeply entrenched in decades of counter-productive
regulations and guidelines. Telemedicine began to emerge as incompatible
with these guidelines after COVID-19. So, the ideal solutions that should
develop will likely not be the eventual response.
Incorporative of this reality, this part of this Note separates the
solutions that should be implemented from predictions of what will actually
occur. The first section focuses on the solutions that the international
community should implement on both the national and international levels to
pave the way for telemedicine as a vital treatment tool on the global front.
National and international solutions will be discussed in the short and long
term contexts, first addressing solutions necessary to implement telemedicine
during and shortly after the COVID-19 pandemic, then discussing strategies
for long-term implementation after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides. The
second section will predict the likely response to telemedicine that will
actually arise given historic revisions to international regulations and
developments during COVID-19.
A. Required Changes
Effective long-term change on the national level will likely be
determined by the steps that are taken in the short term, during or immediately
following the cessation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Until COVID-19,
telemedicine was largely considered an emerging treatment tool that was
nonessential to healthcare providers. However, social distancing requirements
and the high risk of spreading the disease changed that. Telemedicine in most
cases became the only way for doctors to treat and consult with patients safely
and effectively.188 Prior hesitancy to rely on telemedicine as a mainstream
treatment tool evaporated because of necessity. Accordingly, restrictions were
forced to loosen on the national level, and remote treatment largely replaced
traditional forms of treatment, such as in-person interactions between doctors
and patients.189
188
189

Monaghesh & Hajizadeh, supra note 8, at 2.
Id.
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During COVID-19, States were forced to quickly solve several of the
issues that previously inhibited effective telemedical treatment. For example,
due to the influx of COVID-19 positive patients in critical condition, licensure
restrictions were reduced to allow physicians to treat patients across state and
regional lines.190 Similarly, private and government insurers amended
payment structures to allow for broader reimbursement and financing for
telemedical treatment both related and unrelated to COVID-19.191 Further,
COVID-19 acted as a uniting force for many nations; strong social programs
were established and economic relief was provided to support individuals and
communities.
The success of the long-term national strategy depends on the extent
to which States capitalize on the progress made by implementing telemedicine
during COVID-19. When COVID-19 subsides, nations should think critically
about a more developed national response that better incorporates
collaboration with other national and international agencies. This strategy
should clearly address critical issues that slowed the implementation of
telemedicine prior to and during COVID-19, such as financing, licensing, and
other important regulatory concerns. The restrictions that decreased during the
national COVID-19 emergency response should be increased to allow
healthcare providers to take full long-term advantage of the reduced
regulations they enjoyed during the pandemic.192 Further, international
humanitarian aid, delivered nationally through the form of telemedicine,
should be considered and implemented.
From an international perspective, the WHO is the international
organization capable of enacting the most significant change. Thus, in the
short-term, it is vital that the WHO reassure Member States that it is the entity
most capable of providing a global solution during PHEICs. Inaction and
missteps by the WHO during the early stages of COVID-19 created
skepticism about the WHO’s global leadership capabilities.193 If national
leaders lose confidence in the WHO—the leading global healthcare
organization—not only will compliance with existing regulations decrease,
any new regulations or recommendations in the future might garner similar
skepticism. At worst, this skepticism could cause additional Member States to
withdraw entirely from the WHO. Any of these actions would significantly
harm a short or long term strategy for implementing telemedicine across
borders.
The WHO must also act as the driving force in facilitating crossborder treatment. Rather than relying exclusively on the IHR and delegating
190

Slomski, supra note 178, at 1021.
COVID-19 Telehealth Coverage Policies, CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y (Sept.
15, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.cchpca.org/resources/covid-19-telehealth-coveragepolicies (reporting reimbursement policies during COVID-19 in the U.S.).
192 Slomski, supra note 178, at 1021.
193 Rogers & Mandevilli, supra note 138.
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broad treatment strategies to each Member State, the WHO should, at a
minimum, work with Member States to recommend a more comprehensive
and uniform approach, including cross-border telemedical treatment, that
States can implement for more rapid global recovery. Although any
recommendations provided by the WHO would still be non-binding under
IHR (2005), they would at least provide a suggested path for uniform
treatment.194 This would also allow the WHO to at least partially moderate the
economic, social, and political issues that tended to flare up during PHEICs
and lead States away from an exclusively siloed approach.
The long-term international implementation of telemedicine requires
more comprehensive, systematic reform.195 To account for the new challenges
and opportunities for telemedicine created during COVID-19, this reform will
require the current international healthcare framework to significantly expand
in three ways. First, a new version of the IHR should be drafted that further
expands the purpose and scope of the IHR and incorporates a more detailed
treatment strategy for States Parties to follow during PHEICs and beyond.
IHR (2005)’s transition from a “disease-specific model” to an “all-hazards
strategy” demonstrates the WHO’s intention to broaden the IHR. 196
Consistent with this intention, the next revision of the IHR should expand
beyond surveillance and reporting after the WHO declares a PHEIC and into
treatment and prevention of all public health risks. The new revision of the
IHR should also include new requirements for telemedical treatment and
address specific barriers to utilizing telemedicine across borders. For example,
rather than merely recommending collaboration and assistance between States
Parties without providing specific guidance on how to proceed,197 the IHR
should require States Parties to maintain minimum requirements so that they
can collaborate with one another through telemedicine. Licensing,
reimbursement, and other impeding issues should be addressed explicitly in
the IHR or reserved for resolution in supplemental guidelines produced by the
WHO.
Second, additional guidelines beyond the IHR should be
implemented and agreed upon by Member States. This expansive step is
twofold: include all States Parties in the process of creating and ratifying
supplemental agreements and confer upon those agreements a binding effect.
Currently, supplemental recommendations issued by the WHO are both
narrow and ineffective—they are reserved for PHEICs, they are explicitly

194

WHO, supra note 14, at art. 1 (defining temporary and standing recommendations as
“non-binding advice”).
195 See Anthony C. Smith et al., Telehealth for Global Emergencies: Implications for
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), 26 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 309 (2020).
196 Gostin & Katz, supra note 44, at 267.
197 WHO, supra note 14, at art. 44.
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“temporary,” and they have no binding effect.198 These recommendations are
likely imposed weakly to allow States Parties flexibility during PHEICs.
However, by including States in the process of creating these
recommendations prior to a PHEIC, States can contribute input that would not
only prepare them to comply, but also make them more willing to comply.
Additionally, this would grant the WHO more ground to impose penalties for
noncompliance, since States will have the opportunity to collaboratively
decide what those specific penalties should be.
Third, an international treaty should also be created that specifically
creates a uniform response to public health emergencies by means of
telemedicine. This measure, although ambitious, is not without precedent.
Past similar treaties addressing disaster mitigation and relief through
telecommunications have been entered into force. For example, the Tampere
Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster
Mitigation and Relief Operations imposes an obligation on States Parties to
“cooperate among themselves and with non-State entities and
intergovernmental organizations . . . to facilitate the use of telecommunication
resources for disaster mitigation and relief.”199 The Tampere Convention lays
out specific guidelines for requesting assistance from other States Parties and
imposes requirements on States Parties for responding to requests.200 The
Tampere Convention also establishes steps to resolve anticipated conflicts,
such as reimbursement201 and regulatory barriers.202 Healthcare is a much
more complex and rapidly-evolving industry than telecommunications, and a
similar treaty regulating telemedicine would require States to consider a
variety of additional factors. However, the Tampere Convention serves to
illustrate that a comparable agreement for telemedicine is possible. And that
agreement could serve as a valuable legal instrument helping expand the
international healthcare regulatory framework.
B. Predicted Response
As important as the solutions discussed above are to ensuring the
success of telemedicine in the short and long term, the reality is that global
leaders will likely continue ignoring these solutions for several reasons. For
one, WHO Member States, especially emerging markets, will long be

Id. at art. 1 (defining “temporary recommendation” as “non-binding advice issued by
WHO pursuant to Article 15 for application on a time-limited, risk-specific basis, in
response to a public health emergency of international concern”).
199 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster
Mitigation and Relief Operations, art. 3, 2296 U.N.T.S. 5 (entered into force Jan. 8, 2005).
200 Id. at art. 4.
201 Id. at art. 7.
202 Id. at art. 9.
198

596

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 50:563

recovering from the economic strain of COVID-19. Some experts suggest that
a global recession is inevitable after COVID-19 subsides.203 This will likely
cause State leaders to continue prioritizing their own nations over any form of
collaborative globalism. This is unlikely to change until the residual effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic subside. Additionally, some nations will not
relinquish the skepticism formed against the WHO over the COVID-19
response. This skepticism will likely cause nations to lean away rather than
voluntarily step into any additionally restrictions imposed by the WHO.
Lastly, the WHO seems hesitant to encroach upon the autonomy of Member
States. This resulted in weak requirements in IHR (2005) and unbinding
recommendations throughout the COVID-19 response. To be effective, the
telemedicine regulatory framework must impose definitive, binding
guidelines, which the WHO seems unlikely to create.
Instead, after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, national and global
leaders will likely settle for changes that are easier to implement, but less
effective in the long run. First, health and political leaders will address the
failures of the COVID-19 response and the substantial steps that should have
taken place prior to COVID-19. This analysis will identify action that States
should have taken during the pandemic to minimize the catastrophic effects
that the virus had nationally and internationally. Because telemedicine played
such an integral role during the COVID-19 response on the national level,
international leaders will almost certainly evaluate it as a treatment solution
when formulating next steps. However, the likelihood that those next steps
will result in a robust framework to host telemedicine globally is low.
Second, both national and international regulations will be reviewed
and revised. National restrictions that were relaxed during COVID-19 to
ensure an optimal response to the outbreak will probably remain relaxed to
some extent to allow telemedicine to continue its application in a postpandemic world. Because telemedicine proved to be a widespread and
successful tool during COVID-19, healthcare providers and patients will
continue telemedicine in the future. Additionally, international regulations
will take new form. Although it is doubtful that the IHR will be revised to
impose treatment requirements on States Parties or increase penalties for
violations, it will incorporate the findings from COVID-19 and continue
expanding toward the all-hazards approach to disease prevention and control.
The new revision will slightly expand past IHR 2005, but treatment options
will still be left to Member States due to populist critique of the WHO during
COVID-19. Internal measures will also be implemented by the WHO to
ensure PHEICs are addressed and contained more rapidly and efficiently.
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See Nuno Fernandes, Economic Effects of the Coronavirus Outbreak (COVID-19) on
the World Economy 2 (IESE Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. WP-1240-E).
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V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the framework that develops around telemedicine after
the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, one thing is clear: telemedicine will only
continue to grow as a vital treatment tool in the healthcare industry.204 The
extent of that growth on the international level is dependent on a more robust
regulatory framework established by global leaders within the WHO. The
significant issues addressed in this Note were exposed by COVID-19 but are
not unique to the most recent pandemic. If appropriate actions are not taken
to facilitate telemedicine as a global treatment tool, some of the same failures
experienced during the COVID-19 response will certainly translate to future
natural disasters and public health emergencies. Telemedicine has the
potential to become one of the most powerful tools of global medicine. But
without the appropriate framework facilitating this vital tool, this great power
will only become unduly stifled.

204

See Telemedicine Market to Reach USD 185.66 Billion by 2026 | Global Report Size,
Share, Growth, Analysis, Forecast [2019–2026], supra note 7 (anticipating 23.5% growth
in global telemedicine by 2026).

